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1 Introduction
Nowadays, many resources on planet Earth are scarce and threatened of extinction.
Some of them are even only partially accessible to us. At the same time, the extant
resources often arrive online and need to be allocated in highly constrained environ-
ments. For this reason, we need a simplistic manner in which we allocate resources
online that enables us to satisfy various economic, ecological and societal needs in our
daily life. Sustainable resource allocations are vital for the survival of our planet. For
example, we work with a food bank allocating donated food to charitable organiza-
tions. Recent reports showed that giving out food to people in need improves their
family life and their productivity at work1. As another example, we collaborate with
a national organ exchange scheme on allocating organs of deceased donors to patients
on a waiting list. Now, the allocation decisions could save lives. Evidently, online fair
divisions are important due to their significant returns. In this abstract, I summarize our
work on online fair division. In particular, I present two models for online fair division:
(1) one existing model for fair division in food banks and (2) one new model for fair
division of deceased organs to patients. I further discuss simple mechanisms for these
models that allocate the resources as they arrive to agents. In practice, agents are of-
ten risk-averse having imperfect information. Within this assumption, I report several
interesting axiomatic and complexity results for these mechanisms and conclude with
future work.
2 Foodbank Allocations
We formulated an online model for fair division in foodbanks. In this model, m indi-
visible items arrive in some strict ordering o and are allocated to n agents. Each agent
has some non-negative (private) utility for each item. Every time an item arrives, the
agents report bids for the item thus revealing their valuations for it and a mechanism
allocates it to one of the agents. Aleksandrov et al. [2015] provides initial axiomatic
analysis of two such mechanisms for this model: (1) LIKE gives uniformly at random
1https://www.foodbank.org.au/
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each next item to an agent that bids positively and (2) BALANCED LIKE gives uni-
formly at random each next item to an agent with fewest items among those agents
that bid positively. As these mechanisms are randomized, each agent receives each
item with some ante probability. Their expected utility is the dot product between the
vectors of their ante probabilities and their cardinal utilities for items. I studied axioms
of these mechanisms such as envy-freeness ex post, ex post efficiency and competitive-
ness among many others. For example, LIKE can be much less fair than BALANCED
LIKE. Even with 0/1 utilities, LIKE could give all items to only one agent. In contrast,
BALANCED LIKE tries to give each agent the same number of items. However, both
of these mechanisms are ex post efficient with 0/1 utilities. They satisfy this property
because, in each actual allocation, they give out all items only to agents that value them
positively and the sum of the agent’s ex post utilities is equal tom.
Theorem 1 With 0/1 utilities, LIKE and BALANCED LIKE are ex post efficient.
Even with utilities in {0, 1, 2}, checking efficiency is computationally expensive.
We reduce from the coNP-hard problem RESTRICTED3UNSAT: given a set C =
{c1, . . . , cm} of clauses each of at most 3 literals over n propositions such that each
of them occurs twice positively and once negatively in C, is C unsatisfiable; see
Demange and Ekim [2008]?
Theorem 2 With utilities in {0, 1, 2} and either mechanism, checking Pareto efficiency
of an allocation is coNP-hard.
Proof sketch. I depict the reduction in terms of example: P = {p1, p2, p3}, c1 =
{p1, p2,¬p3}, c2 = {¬p1, p2, p3}, c3 = {p1,¬p2, p3}. Similarly as in de Keijzer et al.
[2009], we define allocation π(I) for each partial interpration I over the propositions.
We next represent the allocation instance.
o ip1 ip2 ip3 ic1 ic2 ic3 isat,p1 isat,p2 isat,p3 ip1c1 ip2c1 i¬p3c1 i¬p1c2 ip2c2 ip3c2 ip1c3 i¬p2c3 ip3c3
ap1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 0 0
a¬p1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 0 0 0 0 0
ap2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 0 0 [1] 0 0 0 0
a¬p2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 0
ap3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 0 0 [1]
a¬p3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0
ac1 0 0 0 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
ac2 0 0 0 0 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
ac3 0 0 0 0 0 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
aun,p1 [1] 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
aun,p2 1 [1] 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
aun,p3 1 1 [1] 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
asat,c1 0 0 0 1 1 1 [1] 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
asat,c2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 [1] 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
asat,c3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Let I∅ be the null interpretation; i.e. maps no propositions. We showed that the
set C is unsatisfiable iff π(I∅), denoted as the utilities in brackets, is Pareto efficient.
The proof resembles the one from de Keijzer et al. [2009]. However, our construction
gives tighter bound on the complexity of the problem and thus gives a better inside on
its possible parameterizations. Moreover, we needed to guarantee that the allocation
π(I∅) occurs with positive probability with each of these mechanisms, i.e. each agent
is “eligible” for each next item in the ordering.✷
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We studied competitiveness of these mechanisms as well. The egalitarian welfare
is equal to the minimum agent expected utility. In Aleksandrov et al. [2015], we com-
puted the competitive ratios of these mechanisms from egalitarian perspective against
the optimal (offline) mechanism that knows all the information about the future items.
In summary, with 0/1 utilities, the offline competitive ratios of LIKE and BALANCED
LIKE are at least n. With general utilities, LIKE is n-competitive whereas BALANCED
LIKE is not at all.
Another interesting issue with these mechanisms is their complexity of comput-
ing ex post and ex ante outcomes. With any of them, we can compute actual discrete
allocations in O(n · m) space and time. Interestingly, LIKE has the same complex-
ity of computing ante allocations because each agent gets an item they like with ante
probability of one divided by the number of agents that like the item. By comparison,
BALANCED LIKE is computationally hard. The reduction is parsimonious from the
problem of computing the number of perfect matchings in a given undirected bipartite
graph; see. e.g. Dagum and Luby [1992], Saba´n and Sethuraman [2013].
Theorem 3 With 0/1 utilities, computing the agent probabilities is in P with LIKE
whereas is in #P-hard with BAL. LIKE.
Proof sketch. With BALANCED LIKE, I illustrate the reduction on a simple example
in which a 3-regular bipartite graph G = (U, V,E) is given: U = {u1, u2, u3, u4}, V
= {v1, v2, v3, v4} and E = {(u1, v1), (u1, v2), (u1, v4), (u2, v2), (u2, v3), (u2, v4),
(u3, v1), (u3, v3), (u3, v4), (u4, v1), (u4, v2), (u4, v3)}. The allocation instance is
represented in the following tabular form.
o v1 v2 v3 v4 u
1
1 u
2
1 u
1
2 u
2
2 u
1
3 u
2
3 u
1
4 u
2
4 i1 [i2]
e11 [1] 0 0 0 [1] [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
e21 0 [1] 0 0 [1] [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
e31 0 0 0 [1] [1] [1] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
e12 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
e22 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
e32 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
e13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
e23 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
e33 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
e14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
e24 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
e34 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
[s] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 [1]
Intuitively, each agent of each triplet of consecutive agents possibly receives exactly
one of the first 3 · n items; e.g. the utilities of the first three such agents are denoted
in bold brackets. With this argument, we showed that there is 1-to-2n correspondence
between the perfect matchings in G and the possible allocations of the first 3 · n + 1
items such that each agent gets exactly one item. For this reason, the probability of
agent s for item i2 is
1
3·n+1
· 1
3n
· |PERF(G)|.✷
Finally, in Aleksandrov et al. [2015], I also validated these mechanisms on both
generated and real-world preference profiles: uniform binary utilities, correlated binary
utilities, Borda utilities, etc.
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3 Deceased Organ Matchings
There are n patients on a strict waiting list. Each patient has two major compatibil-
ity indicators: blood type (O, A, B, AB) and estimated post-transplant survival index
(EPTS). At a given moment, a pair of kidneys arrives. Each kidney has similar param-
eters: blood type (O, A, B, AB) and kidney donor profile index (KDPI). Each patient
has utility −|EPTS−KDPI| for each kidney. Patients in the waiting list may arrive or
depart. For example, in Australia, a patient is added to this list nearly every 15 min.
At the same time, patients may leave the list in case they say have (offline) exchanged
organs from living donors. There are some hard constraints: e.g. patients of type O can
be matched to organs of types O only. Further, there are some soft constraints as well:
e.g. patients of type AB can be matched to organs of types O, A, B and AB, but are pre-
ferred to be matched to organs from type AB. Whilst this matching is possibly efficient
w.r.t. blood type, it might not be necessarily efficient w.r.t. the “life-longevity” indices.
However, in Australia, the waiting list contains patients from any blood type. More-
over, only up to 5% of the people in the waiting list have blood type AB and around
50% of the people in this list have blood type O. This indicates a real fairness issue:
patients of type AB can access 100% of the donated deceased organs and patients of
type O can access only 50% of them.
For this reason, I discuss two simple deterministic mechanisms for allocating kid-
neys to patients that take into account both the blood type and index compatibility.
HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH computes the sub-list of patients in the current wait-
ing list who minimize |EPTS−KPDI| among those with exact blood type match for
the new organ. SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH computes the sub-list of patients in the
current waiting list who minimize |EPTS−KPDI| among those with compatible blood
type match for the new organ. Each of these mechanisms splits the list of eligible pa-
tients into four sub-lists, one per blood type, and allocates each kidney to an eligible
patient from one of the sub-lists that has the greatest length. Ties between sub-lists
of the same length are broken by giving priority to the patients with more compatible
blood type for the new organ. Ties between patients are broken using the waiting list
in favor of agents who has waited the longest; see e.g. Ur et al. [1992].
I propose several novel properties of the allocation mechanisms. A mechanism is
blood type efficient if there is no other allocation in which each agent is matched to an
organ of some more compatible blood type. A mechanism is index efficient if there is
no other allocation in which each agent is matched to an organ with index of higher
quality. Interestingly, HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is blood type efficient because
each organ is matched to a patient with exactly the same type. On the other hand,
SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is not blood type efficient. To see this, just consider
two patients of type AB and one patient of type O, all with the same survival index,
and an organ of type O. This mechanism gives the organ to the patient of type AB that
has waited longest. In regard to index efficiency, both of these mechanisms violate
this axiom in general simply because, at the current round, they might match an organ
with KDPI of 100 to a patient with EPTS of 1 but, at some later round, another organ
could arrive with KDPI of 1 for this patient. However, as the length of the waiting list
in practice is quite large, we are motivated to consider a subclass of “exact” matching
instances in which, for each organ, there is a patient in the list with exact index match.
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Theorem 4 HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is blood type efficient and SOFTTYPE-
BESTINDEXMATCH is not. With exact instances, SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is
index efficient and HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is not.
Additionally, I consider two envy-freeness ex post notions. A patient of type a
would envy a patient of another type b for a compatible organ of type c if b 6= c and
the latter patient is allocated the organ. This envy accounts for the blood type. A
mechanism is blood type envy-free if no agent envies another w.r.t. their blood types.
Envy-freeness could be defined for indices as well. A patient with EPTS index p would
envywith |q−s|/(|p−s|+ ǫ) another patient with EPTS q for a compatible organ with
KDPI s if the latter patient is allocated the organ. The value of ǫ is tiny. A mechanism
is index envy-free if no agent envies another w.r.t. their indices.
Theorem 5 HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is blood type envy-free and SOFTTYPE-
BESTINDEXMATCH is not. With exact instances, SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is
index envy-free and HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is not.
Theorem 5 is easy to prove. We can further study bounded envy-freeness as well;
see e.g. Aleksandrov [2016].
Theorem 6 With any instances, SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is bounded index envy-
free with 1 and HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is not.
Proof. With SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH, for each organ, one of the “eligible”
agents receives it. They do not envy any other agent. Each other “eligible” agent
envies them with at most 1. Each other non-“eligible” agent envies only this “eligible”
agent with at most 1 and none of the other agents.
With HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH, consider two patients of types O and AB
and EPTS indices of 100 and 1, respectively, and one organ of type O and KDPI of 1.
This mechanism matches the organ to the patient of type O and index of 100. But, then
the patient of type AB has envy equal to∞ as ǫ goes to 0.✷
Let us next take a look at the competitiveness of these mechanisms. Recall, we as-
sume that there is a patient in the current list of type b for each new organ of type b. The
optimal (offline) allocation w.r.t. blood types is the one in which each patient receives
an organ of their most compatible blood type. The objective is the number of agents
matched to organs of the same blood type. HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH achieves
this outcome whereas SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is sub-optimal. We could also
study competitiveness w.r.t. “life-longevity” indices. Now, optimally, each patient is
matched to an organ of the closest index. The objective is the number of agents matched
to organs of the same quality index. In a special case, SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH
maximizes this outcome whereas HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is sub-optimal.
Theorem 7 HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is blood type optimal and SOFTTYPE-
BESTINDEXMATCH is 2-competitive w.r.t. blood types. With exact instances, SOFT-
TYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is index optimal and HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH is
100 · n-competitive w.r.t. indices.
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Proof. For SOFTTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH, it might mismatch at most half of the
organs w.r.t. blood types. This happens when it gives each organ of type b 6= AB to a
patient of type AB. There are at most half such cross-matches compared to the offline
mechanism.
For HARDTYPEBESTINDEXMATCH, consider the example in the proof of Theo-
rem 6. This mechanism matches the organ to the patient of type O and index of 100.
The optimal decision w.r.t. indices is to match the organ to the patient of type AB and
index of 1. The results follow.✷
Finally, as these deterministic mechanisms output a single ex post allocation, we
can compute it in O(n ·m) space and time wherem is the number of organs.
4 Conclusion
Agents are often entitled to different shares of the resource. For example, in the Food-
bank setting, charities have possibly different feeding abilities. As another example, in
the Organ Matching setting, each patient could require one or two kidney transplants.
How do we then allocate the resources? Finally, how these mechanisms compare em-
pirically against the established matching techniques used in practice.
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